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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADA WILILIAMS and 
R. LeROY WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs ~and Appellants, 
vs. 
JOYCE J. IJL'OYD, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
1019'2 
S'TATE'MENT OF KlN1D OF CAISE 
This is an action for personal injuries, property 
damage and loss of consortium arising out of an 
automobile accident between vehicles driven by 
plaintiff Ada Williams, and defendant Joyce J. 
Lloyd. At trial, damages were the only issue for 
the jury. 
DISPOSTTION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff, Ada Williams, in the sum of $1000.00 
special damages and $'500.00 general dlamages; and 
$100.00 property damage and $50.00 loss of use of 
the au·tomobile fjf R. LeRoy Williams. 
The trial Court denied ·a motion by plaintiffs 
for an additur, or in the altern·ative, for 'a nev1 trial. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON AP'P·EAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment on 
the verdict of the jury and a new trial. 
STATEMENIT OF FAiCT'S 
There is no dispute concerning the occurrence 
of the automobile accident which is ~the basis of this 
action. There is substantial dispute concerning the 
facts :a;s to what injury was sustained by Mrs. 
"'V\lilliams ·and as to what medical treatment and ex-
pense was necesslitated by the injury received in the 
accident, Plaintiffs and Appellants in their sta;te-
ment of facts h1ave stated only the facts most favor-
able to their position, and have not stated the facts 
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. 
The nature of this appeal, Appellants conten-
tion thwt th.e jury verdict i·s again~st the weight of 
the evidence, requires som·e detail las to facts and 
evidence in the argument, and in argument on Point 
III, Respond~nt will detail the conflict in the evi-
den!ce and the factual evidence that support the 
verdict of the jury. 
This action was brought plaintiff Ada Wil-
liams to recover damages, 1a.nd in the complaint, 
never amended, she alleges th·at the injury suffered 
( R. 3) : 
To the plaintiff, Mrs. Ada Williams, a mus-
culoskeletal sprain superimposed on a pre-
esiting cervical and lum'bo s·acral osteoarth-
.ri~tis. 
2 
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Plaintiff R. LeRoy Williams asked damages for 
the damage to his vehicle, loss of consortium and loss 
of use of his vehicle. At time of tri;a;} the damage 
to the vehicle was limited to $100.00 by Plaintiff's 
Requested Instruction No. 6. ( R. ·3 7) 
·The jury returned a verdict in f'avor of Mrs. 
Williams for $1,000.00 special damages ·and $500.00 
general dam·ages and in favor of Mr. Williams for 
$100.00 property dam1age and $50.00 loss of use, 
and for no loss of ·consortium. 
ARGUMENT 
p·o~INT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NO·T c·OM'MIT PRE-
JUDI,CIAL ERROR IN THE C·OURSE OF INS'TR'UCT-
ING THE JURY AND NO CLAIM ·O'F ERR,OR WAS 
MADE BY ~PPE1LLANTS AT TRIAL. 
Appellants set forth claimed facts as to excep-
tions to the jury instructions being taken in the 
presence of the jury. The proceedings of which Ap-
pellants complain did not occur as set for1th in their 
brief. The record on appeal contains an Order by 
the trial judge, Supplementing the Record on Ap-
peal, :as provided by Rule 7'5 (h) of the Utah Rules 
of ·Civil Procedure, and this Order is found at page 
22·2 of the Record on Appeal, as follows: 
"Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 75 (h) the Court finds that at the con-
clusion of the giving of all instru'ctions Mr. 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., from counsel table, 
addressed the Court and the Court's attention 
was called to the fact that the preponderance 
3 
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of evidence instruction and burden of proof 
instruction had not been given. There was no 
discussion by Mr. Baldwin from counsel table 
to the C~ourt a:s _to the wording of his request 
for the Instructions, bU!t merely called the a~t­
tention of the ,Court to the ~absence of the two 
instructions. Mr. B'aldwin and Mr. Dee then 
came to the bench and confidentially, 'as far 
as can be done where such discussions take 
place, the Cou~t and counsel discus'Sed the 
merits of the request and the general tenor 
of vvhat was wanted. That after discussion 
at the bench, Instruction No.1 ('a) was given 
to the jury." 
Appellants' counsel m1ade no objection or took 
any exception to the proceedings and no claim is 
made that he made objection or took exception. 
'The fact th'at the court's atten,tion was called 
to the omlission of two instructions was not prejudi-
cial error. There was no comment or discussion with-
in the hearing of the jury. All th1at was ·done, rthe 
court's attention was called to the fact th'at the 
instruction's on burden of proof and preponderance 
of the evidence had been omitted. Discussion was 
a;t the bench, out of the hearing of the jury. 
Appellants cite several cases to the effect that 
the court shou1ld allow counsel to take exceptions out 
df the ·presence of the jury. ·The cases cited are not 
in point. Appellants have quoted no law, ca·se, or 
text that calling the court's attention to the exclu-
sion of basic, sitock instructions, in the hearing of 
the jury, with no commen1t or discussion concern-
ing the s'ame, would be prejudicial! error. 
4 
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The cases cited by Appellants are cases that 
arose because of the trial court's refusal to allow 
trial counsel to take the exceptions out of the hear-
ing of the jury. 
The case of Dowr~ie v. Powers, 193 F2nd 760, 
cited by Appellant, states thlat the re'ason for the rule 
providing t:hlat objections to instructions be made 
out of hearing of the jury was to afford counsel 
full opportun'ity to state frankly and fully his ob-
jections, without influencing or confusing the jury 
on m'atters a;bout wh'ich it had no concern. 
In our case there was no argument or dis-cus-
sion before the jury. The only statement m~ade was 
that the preponde~ance of evidence and burden of 
proof instructions ·had not been given. If there were 
any claimed prejudice, it would appear that ap-
pellant must show prejudice by wha;t was said in 
the presence of the jury, not by the mere fact th~at 
the court was advised briefly, without 1argument or 
discussion, that the instructions as to burden of 
proof and preponderance of the evidence had been 
omitted. 
In the case of Nolan v. B·ailey, 254 F2nd 638, 
cited by Appellant, the court asked counsel, withi11 
hearing of the jury, whether he h·ad any objection 
to the in'Structions and counsel stJa;ted he h·ad no 
objections. On Appe'al, the Appellate Court held 
that there was no error by the trial court in asking 
counsel, in open court, and in the he-aring of the 
jury, if he had any objections. The court further 
5 
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stated that the reason for the rule is to give counsel 
the right to make objections fully and completely 
out of hearing of the jury and that the rule is for 
the benefit of counsel. 
Swift v. Southern R,ailw~ay Co., 307 F2nd 315 
held it was not reversible error to require counsel 
to take exceptions to instructions in the hearing 
of the jttry. 
No claim is made by appellant th'at any objec-
tion or exception was taken to the alleged prejudi-
cial proceeding, or at 'any time until the filing of 
a motion for new trial. The failure to object or take 
excep1tion to the proceedings claim·ed to be irregular 
precltldes the review of such claimed irregular pro-
ceeding by the Appellate Court. In the case of State 
v. Zimmerman, 78 U. 126, 1 P2d 962, on a motion 
for new trial, the defendant assigned as error a 
statement by the trial court to the jury, after it 
appeared that the jury was having difficulty in 
reaching a verdict, to the effect that the evidence 
was clear and simple. The jury retired and then 
returned shortly with a guilty verdict. The follow-
ing language is take from the opinion : 
"No claim is made by appellant that any ob-
jection or exception was taken to the state-
ment made by the trial court to the jury at 
the time such statement was made or at all 
until the filing of the motion for a new trial. 
Appellant contends th·at the statement c~m­
plained of was in the nature of an ~nst~c~Ion 
to the jur~ and should have been In writing. 
6 
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It is well established in this jurisdiction that 
an exception to an instruction must be m1a,de 
before verdict, otherwise it may not be re-
viewed on appeal. The statemen~t complained 
of, however, cannot well be said to be an in-
struction, but whether it be regarded as an 
instruction or as a remark, the rule is the 
sa,me. A11 objectionable remark directed ·to the 
jury must be excepted to or it may not be re-
viewed on appe·al, 17 C.J. 79. A remark of a 
judge to a jury may not be said to be an order, 
decision, or ruling and therefore it is not 
demed excepted to under the provisions of 
section 6806, Co1npiled Laws of Utah, 1917. 
We are thus precluded from reviewing the 
instruction or remark which appellant seeks 
to h1a~e reviewed, because, so far as appears, 
no exception was taken thereto until after 
verdict.'' 
T'his court has held in many cases tha:t the court 
will not review alleged error when no objection or 
exception was taken at the tim.e of trial. Meier v. 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2nd 182, 389 P2nd 734; Han-
son v. Gener.al Builders Supply Company, 15 Utah 
2nd 143, 389 P2nd 61; Porcupine Reservoir Co. vs. 
Lloyd W. Keeler Corpor~ation, 15 Utah 2nd 318, 
392 P2 620. 
In Huber v. Newman, 106 Utah 363, 145 P·2nd 
780, this Court said: 
"It is elementary that when a party does not 
raise objectio11s belov1 when he h1a.d notice and 
opportunity to object, he may not be heard to 
complain for the first tlme on appeal. We hold, 
therefore, that defendant waived all of these 
7 
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defects if any there were, by failing to object 
below and we shall not further consider them." 
l-Iill v. Cloward, 3'77 P2nd 186, 14 U'tah 2nd 55, 
a recent Utah case, sets forth the rule that claimed 
error or cla;imed prejudicial occurrence is not 
grounds for reversal if objection is not m'ade and 
that the f'ailure to object waives any rights which 
m1ay have existed to object. The court held: 
"But there is an insuperable difficulty with 
the plaintiff's position. His counsel let the 
ineident pass without objection and without 
a request to rectify any harm he thought had 
been done. Fair play and good conscience re-
quire that he do so at the earliest opportunity. 
It would be m1a,nifestly unjust to permit a 
party to sit silently by, believing that preju-
dicial error had been committed, proceed with 
the trial to its completion, and allow the jury 
to deliberate and reach a verdict, to see if he 
wins, then if he loses, come forward with a 
claim th·at such error rendered the verdict 
1a nullity. If this could be done, proceedings 
after such an occurrence would be 'in vain and 
thus an imposition upon the court, the jury 
and ·all concerned. The court will not coun-
tenance any such mockery of its proceedings. 
If something· occurs which the party thinks 
is wrong and so prejudicial to him that ~e 
thereafter cannot h1ave a fair trial, he must 
make his objection promptly and seek redress 
by moving for a mistrial, or by having cau-
tionary instructions given, if that is deemed 
adequate, or be held to waive whatever rights 
may h:a.ve existed to do so." 
8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
CO'UNSEL FOR DEFENDANT DID NOT C·OMMIT 
PREJUDICIAL ERR'OR, AND CLAIMED ERROR OF 
COUNSE'L IS NOT A GROUND O·F APiPEAL. 
Claimed error of counsel is not a grounds for 
appeal or reversal of a Judgment. 
Appellants have raised two points on appeal 
that are one point. 'The argument m'a~de in relation 
to Point I of Appellants' Appeal is Respondent's 
complete answer to the claimed Point II. 
POINT III 
THE C·O'UR·T DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
This Court has ruled uniformly and repeatedly 
that the trial court has a broad discretion in ruling 
on a motion for new tri1al and that the ruling should 
not be disturbed unless there is a plain abuse thereof. 
The rule is well set forth in the case of Wellman v. 
Noble, 12 Utah 2nd 350, 366 P.2d 701: 
"'The trial Court has a broad dis-cretion in 
ruling on such a motion (i.e. 'A motion for 
a new trial) which we should not disturb 
unless it is a plain abuse thereof. We apply 
a different rule in determining whether this 
Court on appeal should grant a new trial and 
whether the trial Court abused its discretion 
in granting a new trial. The appellate Court 
should overrule the tri,al Court's denial of a 
new trial involving a jury verdict only when 
upon a survey of all the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefron1 
and when viewed in the light most favorable 
9 
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to the jury verdict, the amount of the award 
cannot be justified by the evidence on any 
reasonable basis.'' 
Appellants cite the case of Jensen v. Howell, 
75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034, however the holding of the 
court in that case clearly supports the proposition 
that in law cases, the findings of the trial court 
must be upheld when there is sufficient competent 
evidence to support the findings. 
Appellanits further misconstrue the 1applicable 
law in interpretation of the case of Toomer's Estate 
v. Union Pacific R~ailroad Company, 121 Utah 37, 
239 P2d 163. That case involves the question of up-
holding ·a jury verdict and states the genel4al rule 
that the evidence and every inference and intend-
ment fairly arising therefrom is to be viewed in 
the light MOST FAVORABLE TO THE VERDICT 
OF THE JURY. (E1nphasis ours) 
This court has held repeatedly that, on appeal, 
the court must view the evidence in the light most 
favo~able to the decision of the jury. Anderson v. 
Nixon, 104 U '262, 139 P'2nd 216; I vie v. Richardson, 
9 Utah 2nd 5, 33H P!2 '781; Ferguson v. Jongsrna, 
10 Utah 2nd 179, 350 P2nd 404; Taylor v. Johnson, 
15 u·2nd 34'2, 393 P2nd 382. 
This court recently held in Gordon v. Provo 
City, 391 P'2nd 4·30, 15 Utah 2d 287, that there must 
be substantial and prejudicial error to reverse a 
judgment; that there is a presumption of Vialidity 
of the jury verdict; and that the evidence and all 
10 
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reasonable inferences that could be drawn there-
from are to be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the jury findings. 
In this case there was a subs:tantial conflict 
in the evidence as to the injuries suffered in the 
accident and as to whether or not the medical tre~at­
merrt and operation were a direct and proximate 
result of th·e accident. 
T·h.is court has held th!a;t the jury has the pre-
rogative of judging the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight of the evidence. In Arnold Machinery 
Company v. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 357 P.2·d 496, 
11 Utah 2nd 246, it was held that a jury was not 
obliged to allow the full amount of repair costs to 
plaintiff's property, although there was no evidence 
otherwise, and a witness can be disbelieved entirely 
because of self-interest; can be disbelieved in part; 
or 'lris testimony discounted to any reasonable extent. 
The jury is not required to believe any of the 
testimony of plaintiffs or their witnesses and as 
the fact finder, the jury is not required to believe 
the uncontradicted evidence of a witness. Gagos v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, et al, 48 P2nd 449, 
'87 Utah 101; llfiller v. Colurabi~a Trust Compiany, 
225 Pac. 609, 63 Utah 305. 
In the case of Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2nd 
422, 394 P2d 77, this court upheld 'a jury verdict 
where $1.00 damages were given by the jury, al-
though the uncontradicted evidence in the case 
11 
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showed substantially greater damages. In holding 
that the self interest of a witn·ess m·ay be sufficient 
basis for rejecting his testimony and th'at the jury 
m1ay judge testimony in the light of their experience 
in everyday affairs of life, the court said: 
"Short of capriciously or arb'itrarily reject-
ing credible evidence when there is no sound 
reason to do so, it is the exclusive province of 
the jury to determ'ine credibility of witnesses.'' 
By ·Statute in Utah the jury is the exclusive 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses; the sta-
tute, U.C.A., 78-·24-1, states: 
"Who May Be Witnesses - Jury to Judge 
Credibility. Alii persons, without exception, 
otherwise than as specified 'in this chapter, 
who, h1aving organs of sense, can perceive, and 
perceiving, can m'ake known their perceptions 
to others, may be witnesses. Neither parties 
nor other persons who have an interest in the 
event of ·an action or preceeding are excluded; 
nor those who have been convicted of crime; 
nor persons on account of their opinions on 
matters of religious belief; although, in every 
case the credibility of the witness may be 
drawn in question, by the evidence :affect~ng 
his character for truth, honesty or 1ntegrrt):', 
or by his moti~es, or by contradi~tory evi-
dence; and the JUry are the exclusive JUdges 
of his credibility." 
The jury was not bound to believe the evidence 
presented by plaintiffs and were not bound to be-
lieve the plaintiffs. 
This was a case of conflicting and disputed 
12 
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evidence from plaintiffs' own witnesses as to the 
injuries resulting from the ,accident. There was no 
question that plaintiff Ada Willi!ams was suffering 
from a pre-existing ·back and neck condition ·and 
the complaint, never amended, alleged her injury 
to be, ( R. 3) : 
'''a musculo skeletal sprain superim·posed on 
a pre-existing cervical an·d lumbrosacral 
arthritis.'' 
Plaintiffs' medical evidence clearly indicated 
that Ada Williams had degenerative disease of the 
discs of the back, pre-existing th'is accident. T'he 
operative procedure was to correct the pre-existing 
degener1ative condition, cervical disc disease, and 
which disease was not proximately caused by the 
accident. 
Mrs. Williams was not aware of any injury 
until after she arrived home ·after th·e accident 
(R. 75) and made no compl1aint of injury at the 
scene (R. 94, 160). After arriving home lVIrs. Wil-
liams had a headache and her neck hurt and she 
went to see Dr. Hargreaves (R. 76). She used hot 
packs on her back and neck ( R. 77) and used trla,c-
tion at home (R. 78). She saw the doctor once a 
week, then later it was every other week, and he 
·prescribed some medicines for pain. She was not 
confined to bed except when using tracticn. (R. 79). 
In October of 1963 she saw Dr. Norman Beck 
and l1ater in November had a neck operation at the 
13 
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Holy Cross Hospital. (R. 84) ·The operation was by 
Dr. ·Beck and Dr. Karavitis ('R. 82). 
Defendant stipulated as to the reason·a:bleness 
of the medical bills and expenses claimed by plain-
tiff with the exception of the ch1arges made by Veri 
Wilde, a p·hysical therapist. Defendant did not agree 
or stipulate that any of the bills were necessitated 
by the accident in question ('R. 3'3, 84, Exhibit 2.) 
There were contradictions in the evidence of 
Mrs. Williams and she was evas~ive in her testimony. 
On direct examin1ation Mrs. William·s testified 
she was hospitalized from November 3rd until De-
cember, the date of the last charge made to her; 
She testified, (R. 81) : · 
Q. An·d ·how long did you stay in the Holy 
Cross Hospital? 
A. I was in there about 4 weeks, I believe. 
Three or four week·s, I don't remember. 
Ag;ain she testified, ( R. 83) : 
Q. When did you enter the hospital? The 
dates ,are shown here as to the date of 
entry? 
A. 11-3-'63 
Q. And does that show the period of time 
for your care from November through 
December? 
A. It does. 
On Cross Examin·ation Mrs. Williams again 
testified she was 'in the hospital for about three 
14 
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weeks then she admitted that she was disch1arged 
from the hospital on November 14, 196·3. (R. 93. 
Exhibit 5.) She was therefore in the hospital 11 
days and discharged the 14th of November not in 
December as she told the jury on dire:ct examin·ation. 
Mrs. Williams testified that s·he had never h'ad 
1any difficulty with her arms or neck prior.to Janu-
ary of 1963 and had never been to a doctor to receive 
any treatment for her neck or prain around her 
neck prior to the accident. She testified : ( R. 85) 
Q. * * * Mrs. Williams, did you h·ave any 
difficulty with your neck and your arms 
prior to January of 1963? 
A. Never. 
Q. H1ad you been to a doctor relative to any 
treatment for your neck or pains around 
your neck? 
A. No. 
She testified that after the accident she had 
some numbness in her hands and she was asked 
on cross examination : ( R. 94) 
Q. Hadn't you had that in 1960, this numb-
ness in your hands? 
A. No, I never. 
Q. You never had numbness in your h·ands 
before? 
A. O·h, I had them go to sleep on me before, 
yes. B·ut not the numbness. 
Q. Not in arising in the morning, your 
hands were never numb? 
15 
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A. No. 
She was then asked about hospitalization in 
19'60 and admitted tha;t hospitaliz;a:tion but it was 
more of ·a checkup, p·ain in her right side, in her 
·heart. (R. 95) lShe testified she had no complaints 
of abnormal distres'S 'at that time. ( R. 9'5) 
The complaints and troubles at the time of her 
'hosp'italization in 1960, she admitted, were true. 
(R. 95) 
Exhibit ·5, received in evidence, the records of 
the Holy Cross Hospital when Ada Williams had 
the cervical neck fusion state: 
"A·dm. Diagnosis CERVICAL DISC DI-
SEASE 
''Fin·al Di'agnosis. C·ervical intervertebral disc 
DEGENERATION. (Emphasis ours) 
The Radiology Department sheet, page '5 of the 
exhibit contains the following: 
'';Clinical· Infromation Cervical disc disease. 
·The Operative Notes, p'age 9 of the exhibit 
state: 
Pre-op Di1agnosis: :Cervical disc degenrative 
syndrome, osteoarthritis 
changes ,C 5-6 C 6-7 
Plaintiffs introduced as Exhibit 10, a letter 
from Dr. Norman R. Beck, stating: 
"'The p'a;tient was referred to Doctor Kiara-
vitis in consultation and found that she had 
16 
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cervical disc degenerative disease, and we both 
recommended disc extraction and interbody 
fusion." 
Nowhere in the hospital records or the report 
of Dr. Beck, the Orthopedic specialist, is there any 
mention of any low back injury ·as ·a result of the 
accident, nor :any complaints of low back injury. 
Dr. Harold P. Hargreaves was the doctor who 
first attended Mrs. Williams. He testified generally 
as to her condition and 'his findings, and on cross 
exam1in'ation admitted th·at he wrote a le·tter to 
plaintiffs' attorney on July 7, 1963 relating his 
findings ·and re~port of her condition (R. 12i5). He 
admitted on cross examination that his findings as 
to her complaints were subjective only, as to any 
neurological complaints ( R. 129). He testified that 
Mrs. Williams had a muscular skeletal sprain (R. 
'1'29). Dr. Hargreaves testified that he saw her the 
25th of January, the day after the accident. (R. 
131) He did not see her th·e afternoon of the acci-
dent ·as testified to by Mrs. Twilliams. 
Dr. Norm·an R. Beck, the Orthopedic specialist 
testified concerning his eXJa.mination of Mrs. Wil-
liams (R. 133). He had x-rays taken by Dr. Robert 
Crowder and these showed some narrowing of the 
intervertebral space between the 6th and 7th cer-
vical vertebrae. He testified that she had a condi-
tion of her neck that was other th1a.n normal, anu 
on answer to a question by plaintiffs' attorney he 
stated: ( R. 115) 
17 
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Q. And would you describe that condition? 
A. Well, prior to, presumb·ably prior to her 
accident she h·ad this 11arrowing of the 
intervertebral dis·c space. 
On cross examination Dr. Beck testified that 
Mrs. Williams had cervical disc degenerative di-
sease and that the degeneration caused the narrow-
ing of the s-pace between the two vertebrae and that 
th·e n1arrowing could cause pressure on the nerve 
root. (R. 117) Dr. Beck testified that in addition 
to the cervical disc degenerative disease causing the 
symptoms, he could add cervical neuratrophia ( R. 
119) an·d this is an abnormality of the cervical 
nerve root caused by any num'ber of things. (R. 
149) Dr. Beck testified that when he examined 
Mrs. Williams, and by his office note of April 10, 
1964, she had no low back pa:in. ( R. 15'2) 
Neither of the two doctors called would or did 
state that the narrowing of the cervical interverte-
bral interS'pace and the degenerative disc disease 
was a proximate result of the ·accident. 
Mr. Williams testified that he had sustained 
dam·age in the sum of $5,800.00 because of loss of 
his wife's companionship an·d services around the 
house. He testified that there was ~a loss of love and 
compan'ionshlip because of her medic'al treatment. 
She moved out of her own bed into another, with a 
board and traction for 3 to 4 months, and because 
of the accident he was not in the same relationship 
of love and companionship. (R. 146) 
18 
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Part of the medical expenses claimed in the 
lawsuit in·cluded bills from Dr. Donald Bailey. (R. 
96) Mrs. Williams admitted that one bill of Dr. 
Bailey included a series of treatments for her stom-
ach, an upper gastro-intestinal series and cardia-
gram taken 4 months after the accident, an·d were 
not bills for neck or back X-rays. (R. -97, .Exhibit 
2.) This bill of Dr. Bailey was for Upper Gastro-
intestinal Series and Cholecystrogram in th·e sum 
of $60.00, dated 5-4-63. 
Mrs. Williams testified that her hospital'iza-
tion in 1960 was for a heart condition ·and pain in 
her left arm. She denied that she had complained 
of numbness in both hands and in the right arm. 
She specifically testified she ha·d pain in her left 
arm and was in the hospital only for a heart condi-
tion. (R. '98). She testified that she never h!ad ·any 
arthritis. ( R. 98) 
Exlribit 4, received in eviden·ce, is a record of 
hospitalization of Mrs. Ada L. Williams in the Holy 
Cross Hospital in June( 1960. She was admitted 
with a di1agnosis of Cholelithiasis (galls tones) . The 
history portion of the exhiibit states: 
'·'N euro: Numbness in hands in AM on aris-
ing." 
"'HEENT: Frequent headaches past 3 
years." 
The records, Exhibit 4, indicate she had some 
gastrointestinal com plaints. 
There were many factors in the tri~al of thj ~; 
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case that would allow the jury to discredit the testi-
mony of Mr. and Mrs. Williams. Her evasiveness 
and misstatement concerning her length of hospital-
ization : her testimony concerning the previous hos-
pitalization; her denial of previous symptoms of 
numbness of the rarms and hands; her statement 
that she saw Dr. H;argreaves the afternoon of the 
accident and her attempt to claim as damages the 
bills for the gall bladder examination after the acci-
dent, it being a condition for which she had pre-
viously been treated. 
The jury s-aw the witnesses, knew of their 
interest, observed their demeanor, heard their testi-
mony an·d was the judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
The medical eviden·ce in the cas-e was in con-
flict and the jury could well h1ave found tha,t the 
operation was not necessitated by the accident, but 
by the pre-existing cervical disc disease. The Ortho-
pedic specialist called would not state that the acci-
dent was the cause of the operation !and plaintiffs 
did not feel it necessary to call as ·a witness the 
Neurosurgeon who treated Mrs. Williams. 
·Counsel for Ap,pellants and Plaintiffs is indulg-
ing in spurious argument in attempting to read in-
ferences in the comments of the trilal judge in refus-
ing to grant a new trial. As ean be seen by the por-
tion of the record quoted by Appellants, a settle-
ment offer had been made to plain·tiffs, and the 
court was aware of the offer and its refusal by 
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Appellants. T·he fact that the verdict for Appellants 
was less th·an was offered in settlement is no indiea-
tion that under the facts that came out at trial, 
and the jury's finding as to those fa:cts, that the 
'jury verdict must be equal to the settlement offer. 
T·he court, in denying the motion for a new 
trial, stated that P1·ainti1ffs had lost. They did lose 
in that the verdict was less than the settlement 
offer. Offers of settlement are m·ade to compromise, 
save expense of trial, and are m·ade by the liawyers. 
In this case the jury heard the facts, saw the wit-
nesses, judged the evidence and facts and returned 
a verdict from the facts they believed from the 
evidence. 
CON'CLUSION 
The Plaintiffs !and Appellants had a fair trial 
in all particulars. 'T·he jury heard the evidence, 
found the facts from the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences, and returned a verdict in conformlity 
with the facts and evidence. 
The trial Judge did not ~a:buse his discretion in 
refusing to grant a new trial and the Judgment 
upon the Jury Verdict should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON AND BALDWIN 
ERNE'ST F. BALDWIN, J·R. 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake CiJty, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Defendant ~and Respondent 
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